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A New Look at a Different Kind of War
An old truism warns historians that their books often reflect the times during
which they were written. When it comes to the Civil War’s guerrilla conflict, for
example, it is hard to miss the shadow of Vietnam that looms over works such as
Philip Paludan’s Victims (1981) or Michael Fellman’s seminal Inside War
(1989). During the two decades since the latter volume’s appearance, numerous
historians have expanded upon Fellman’s foundational depiction of a vicious,
increasingly nihilistic conflict that was more about brutality than glory and tales
of derring-do. Studies of the war’s guerrillas, usually embodied in discrete local
studies, thankfully have become a familiar and useful part of the
historiographical landscape, reminding scholars that Civil War combat was not
confined to the most celebrated battlefields.
Meanwhile, the shadows of other, more recent wars increasingly began to
fall. As American troops confronted insurgents daily in Afghanistan and Iraq,
both the American military and the scholarly community began to look back to
Civil War counterinsurgency. In The Uncivil War (2004), Army officer and Iraq
War veteran Robert Mackey offered precise, useful definitions of the various
manifestations of guerrillas as well as their opponents in order to argue that the
Union Army’s counterinsurgency efforts ultimately proved successful. In
Punitive War, however, another officer, Clay Mountcastle, comes to decidedly
different conclusions. Mountcastle insists that the army’s tough methods, which
increasingly focused on harshly punishing local civilians for guerrilla attacks,
failed miserably. Punitive revenge measures such as the widespread burning of
buildings and towns, as well as field executions of prisoners, only served to
harden the men in blue and encourage exponential increases in the levels of
destruction and reprisal.
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After a survey of previous American experiences with guerrillas, which he
characterizes as ineffective, Mountcastle turns to Missouri. There, he argues, the
Union Army first learned its lessons about counterinsurgency. Frightened and
frustrated, Union soldiers and officers alike abandoned conciliation in desperate
attempts to silence the guerrilla’s rifles. John Pope, in particular, emerged as an
early proponent of punishing locals for nearby bushwhacker activities. First
under Pope, and then under the succession of Union brass that included John C.
Frémont, Henry Halleck, U. S. Grant, and William T. Sherman, the army’s
responses escalated from arrests and demands for monetary compensation to the
regular execution of suspected guerrillas and John Schofield’s destruction of
entire towns. The nadir came with Thomas Ewing’s familiar Order No. 11,
which infamously depopulated the entire region along the Kansas border in
retaliation for William Clark Quantrill’s Lawrence Raid. Notably, all of these
measures routinely failed to stop guerrillas. Nonetheless, generals such as Grant
and Sherman carried the same tactics from their cradle across the western theater
and, in Grant’s case, on to Virginia. Sherman’s March to the Sea as well as
Philip Sheridan’s burning of the Shenandoah Valley proved the culmination of
the Union Army’s determination to punish Southern civilians for both guerrilla
attacks and the war as a whole. Often taking on historians who argue that the
Civil War was not a “total war," notably and pointedly Mark Neely and Mark
Grimsley, Mountcastle concludes that the army’s punitive war, in the end, often
was little more than vengeance, signified a regrettable loss of restraint and
military discipline, and was much more common than the soldiers and later
historians want to admit.
Mountcastle offers a powerful challenge to those who would minimize the
war’s comparable destructiveness and cruelty. Too, he turns up incidents that
otherwise have slipped through the cracks of history while pushing irregular
warfare, as a whole, closer to the center of the conflict. At times, the narrative
does stretch the tight thesis a bit too thinly. Having argued for a Missouri genesis
and a subsequent west-to-east trajectory that in many ways mirrors Grimsley’s
model in his book The Hard Hand of War (1995), Mountcastle ends up spending
considerable ink in his final chapter on explaining the almost simultaneous
appearance of the same phenomena in Appalachia. In so doing, the author misses
much of the recent literature on that corner of the guerrilla war. Nonetheless, on
the whole this is another important addition to the literature on the topic,
signaling as it does a discussion that will continue.
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Kenneth W. Noe is the Draughon Professor of History at Auburn University.
His most recent publication is Reluctant Rebels: The Confederates Who Joined
the Army After 1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
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